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#### IV.—STUDIES IN PINDARIC SYNTAX.

##### I.—THE CONDITIONAL SENTENCE IN PINDAR.

In this study of the conditional sentence in Pindar, no attempt will be made to discuss at length the general subject of the hypothetical period. While there is much less tendency to cast-iron rule, and the genesis of the hypothesis has been sought with a large measure of success in the original *parataxis*, yet scholars still hold, and rightly hold, to certain leading types of conditional sentences. We are still obliged to use formulae that are left over from earlier methods. Transparent form and evident etymology would relieve us of many syntactical problems, such, for instance, as torment us in the theory of the cases. And so a convincing resolution of *εἰ* would be a great gain for the study of the hypothetical sentence. Curtius's parallelism with 'wenn' may please the Germans, the parallelism with 'so' would seem to commend itself to German and English alike; but no one is thoroughly satisfied with these. Lange, it is true, has given the particle a happy name: *εἰ* is an adhibitive as *μή* is a prohibitive. 'Adhibitive' will serve, but only because it is so vague. \**Αν* and *κέν* have not yet come to rest. Every now and then some one arises who finds a vital distinction between them and promulgates a yard-long definition for these perplexing particles; others are content to decline any definition and simply note how they behave in combination. But, while much remains unsettled, the lines of research are clearly marked; and it is not time wasted to ascertain the forms in which such a genius as Pindar has cast his suppositions. Those who deny or despise the literary result will at least appreciate the grammatical statistic or the historic growth.

For convenience' sake the four leading forms of the conditional will be designated as 'logical,' 'anticipatory,' 'ideal,' and 'unreal.' 'Logical' is an old designation; 'unreal' in the form *irrealis* for the condition 'contrary to fact' has become very popular among the Germans of late. The 'ideal' is sometimes called the 'potential.' The *εἰάν* conditional lacks a distinctive name, and I have designated it as the 'anticipatory' conditional, for reasons to be assigned below.

These four forms are crystallizations from a much larger number, just as the modern English hypothesis in its poverty exhibits a striking contrast to the floating wealth of the Shakespearean condition. In Pindar we find that the crystallization has been substantially effected, that his feeling of the conditional is essentially at one with that of the standard language. Only at one remarkable point does he show the influence of the earlier stage.

I. 1. The Logical Condition states the elements in question. It is used of that which can be brought to the standard of fact; but that standard may be for or against the truth of the postulate. All that the logical condition asserts is the inexorable connexion of the two members of the sentence. It is the favorite condition in argument. It is the favorite condition when one wishes to be or seem fair, the favorite condition when one is sure of the premiss. So it is often a *pro forma* condition, just as *si quidem* approaches *quia*; but so long as the negative continues to be μή, the conditional and the causal do not coincide. It is little used in epic poetry, much in dramatic, much in lyric. I have elsewhere shown how clearly it is differentiated in one of its forms, εἰ w. fut. ind., from εἰάν w. the subj.<sup>1</sup> In prose it is largely argumentative or semi-causal.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Logical Condition, like every other form of the conditional sentence, is particular or generic according to the character of the apodosis. Hence, when it has its apodosis in the present it has a double meaning, which adapts it admirably to personal argument, especially when the form εἴ τις is used, which may point either to a definite or to an indefinite person. But as the εἰάν conditional with a present indicative apodosis is regularly generic, it is not without reason that the εἰάν form should be preferred when distinctly generic action is to be expressed. Just as the conative element is not so distinct in the present as in the imperfect, simply because the present has the double function of a present of continuance (durative present) and a present of attainment (aoristic present), so the εἰάν conditional is more distinctly the generic conditional. All this is true of the crystallized language of prose. When we turn to poetry we find

<sup>1</sup> On εἰ with the fut. ind. and εἰάν with the subj. in the Tragic Poets (Transactions of the American Philological Association, 1876), from which paper such phrases as may suit the present purpose will be borrowed.

<sup>2</sup> In a recent edition of Xenophon's Anabasis, by Mr. Pretor, the editor, commenting on 4, 1, excludes the logical condition from the chief forms of the conditional proposition, which the beginner is reminded 'to master once for all.' An editor of Pindar could not afford to treat the logical condition so cavalierly.

that Homer prefers the subjunctive for generic relations, and in this respect Pindar follows him. This brings us to

II. The Anticipatory Condition, which is the name I have given to what is also called the *ἐάν* condition. For this form of the condition we want a word that will harmonize present and future. Anticipation is not expectation, though it is loosely used for expectation. Anticipation treats the future as if it were a present, and so we find an analogue for the protasis of this form in the imperative, which gives us a convenient paratactic representative, although it really represents historically and adequately only *εἰ* with the subj., not *ἐάν* with the subj.

The division of the anticipatory sentence into particular and generic was first made by Bäumlein (1846).<sup>1</sup> The anticipatory condition is particular or generic according to the character of the apodosis (see my Latin Gr. §596 note), just as any other conditional sentence. Only in Greek the present indicative is regularly generic when associated with *ἐάν* in the protasis, as the *praesens propheticum* is so rare as not to count. If we look at the anticipatory sentence historically we shall see that it is a fusion of at least two Homeric sets, *εἰ* with the subjunctive, which seems to have been the original generic, and the *εἴ* *κε*, *ἥν* set, which seems to have been an original particular. In Attic poetry *εἰ* with the subjunctive is occasionally found with a different tone from the older *εἰ* with the subjunctive, and with a decided leaning to the effect of the future indicative or, in the aorist, to the Lat. *si* with fut. perf. of the older period. In Pindar the generic *εἰ* with the subjunctive alone is used. Pindar does not object to *ὅς ἄν* or *ὅταν*, but there is no *εἰ ἄν*, nor *εἴ* *κε*.

III. The Ideal Condition seems to have been developed out of the wish, just as the anticipatory was developed out of the demand. Perhaps 'ideal' is not a very good word, but it may serve to reconcile the two notions of desire and thought. In the ideal condition there is still discernible the old optative notion. There is often a

<sup>1</sup> See Gr. Modi, s. 208, and School Grammar (first ed. 1856) clearly enough §§ 606, 615, 619. I owed my first acquaintance with Bäumlein's Griech. Modi to my teacher, Prof. Franz, of Berlin, who gave us, in his *Schola Graeca* (1850), the leading principles of Bäumlein's book in Greek, and, while the world has doubtless moved beyond Bäumlein, still I consider myself to owe a debt to an author who first gave an impulse to my grammatical studies. The distinction, the importance of which Bäumlein himself did not recognize fully, has passed into the school grammars such as Koch's (§ 114), and is familiar to all English-speaking Hellenists through the grammatical works of Professor Goodwin, who came to his results independently.

wish for or against. As you may use an imperative in irony, so you may use an optative of what you dread. It is the general condition of illustration. It is the condition of fancy,<sup>1</sup> and the word 'fancy' itself in its shifting significance may enable us to understand the Greek optative. The great riddle of the optative remains to be solved—the relation which it bears to the subjunctive, a relation so intimate that it is said to stand for the subjunctive after historical tenses. The *oratio obliqua* optative for the indicative is a comparatively late growth. It came in through the interrogative sentence, thanks to a weakening of the feeling for the moods. But the 'optative for the subjunctive' after historical tenses is familiar enough in the earliest period. Are we to accept Kühner's view and call the optative the subjunctive of the historical tenses in superficial conformity with the peculiar condition of the moods in Latin? Few would accept that now. Or are we to recognize a peculiar propriety in this shifting of demand for the future to dream for the past?<sup>2</sup>

As in the anticipatory, so in the ideal condition, we may have the classification into particular and generic. The generic optative after past tenses corresponds to the generic subjunctive after principal tenses. It was a mistake to call this optative a 'frequentative' optative, as if it were fundamentally different from the generic subjunctive. In both instances the frequentative idea lay in the notion of rule contained in the leading verb.

IV. The Unreal Condition, 'the hypothesis contrary to fact,' seems to be related to the hopeless wish, as the ideal condition to the wish pure and simple. Even Lange in his admirable treatise on *ei* with the optative has given himself the trouble of discriminating between the possibilities and impossibilities of the action of the optative. The only impossibility that language recognizes here is futurelessness. A wish may be madly impossible, but if it belongs to the domain of the future it is optative. Now the hopeless wish is hopeless because it is futureless; and while it may seem strange to turn the familiar statement round and derive the unreal condition from the hopeless wish rather than the hopeless wish from an incomplete unreal condition, be it remembered that the shifting of the point of view, the dramatic change of persons, is of the essence of

<sup>1</sup> 'Mood of the imagination' is what Lange prefers, and 'imagination' covers a great deal; but the imagination is made to work by hope and fear.

<sup>2</sup> Delbrück calls this 'Modusverschiebung,' 'eine Errungenschaft des Griechischen.' (Conj. u. Opt. s. 83.)

the situation. In the logical condition, in the anticipatory, opposing propositions are made in rapid succession. There is no reason why the wish should have been the wish of the speaker. The universe is full of wishes and wishers.

These four chief forms of the conditional sentence are all represented in Pindar, the logical, the anticipatory, the ideal, and unreal.

In Pindar the Logical Conditions far outnumber, indeed almost double, all the others put together. It is largely a mere *pro forma* condition. Occasionally generic, it almost always has in view a particular illustration of the principle involved. The *τῆς* of the *ἐλτῆς* is the victor, the victor's enemy, the victor's encomiast, and doubtless, sometimes, when it seems to us indefinite, it had a special point. This is part of the plastic character of the Pindaric style. His prepositions put before us, as the prepositions of no other Greek poet, the actual place, and so his suppositions are taken largely from concrete instances. Sometimes the reality which he has before him is so fair that it seems for a moment a dream, and he passes over into the optative (I 4 (5), 15; cf. O 6, 4), but his delight is in the sharp, clear-cut indicative. The logical condition may be generic, but it must be remembered that the generic rose out of the individual. So the generic article presents us with the model individual. So the gnomic aorist brings up a typical act of the past, which, being typical, is good for all time. Pindar goes back to the original conception. Under his generic indicative we feel the individual. The purely generic with him takes the subjunctive, but he does not use it much. True, there is moralizing enough, else Pindar were not Greek, but it is moralizing with sharp, personal application. There is a smile, a frown, a flout, under almost every *τῆς* of the logical condition. But it would be a mistake to narrow this form to the particular. The very delight of it is the double edge, the transparent riddle.

To specify. Of 48 logical conditions in Pindar, 19 refer to the victor either in terms, O 6, 77; P 1, 87. 90; 3, 80; N 2, 6; 3, 19; 4, 79; or with more reserve under cover of a *τῆς* or the like, O 2, 62; 5, 23; 11 (10), 5; 14, 7; P 3, 80. 103; 11, 55; 12, 28; N 11, 13; I 3 (4), 1; 4 (5), 22; 5 (6), 10; 8 refer to the poet or his Muse expressly, O 1, 3. 19; 8, 55; 9, 26; P 11, 41; N 7, 69. 75; 9, 28; to an enemy three, P 2, 58; 8, 73; I 1, 66. Adjuration takes the logical form as a matter of course, O 1, 77; I 5 (6), 42; and akin is *ἐπει*, O 3, 42.

Of the generic sentences not included in the exhibit given above, some may be referred without difficulty to specific realization. So O 1, 66 has reference to Tantalus, and the others might easily be disposed of, if we were to allow ourselves the latitude of interpretation indulged in by some commentators. But there is no gain in denying the generic. Let O 14, 7; P 4, 145; I 6 (7), 43 be generic. What we have gained for Pindar is his conception of this relation. It is not so much that of a class as of a type, and so it was in the beginning, as I have said. So it was with the generic article, so it was with the gnomic aorist. The 'any one' was 'some one,' the ideal second person, a true 'thou.'

I now give a list of the logical conditions<sup>1</sup> in Pindar arranged according to the verb of the protasis. The protasis precedes in the vast majority of instances. Where it is subsecutive I have indicated the fact by *s*.

*Protasis.**Apodosis.*

## Present:

O 1, 3	Imv.
66	Pres. ind.
77	Imv.
2, 62 ( <i>οἶδεν</i> = pres.) <i>s</i> . <sup>2</sup>	Pres. ind.
3, 42	Pres. ind.
5, 23	Imv. subj.
9, 26 <i>s</i> .	Fut. ind.
11 (10), 5 ( <i>πράσσει</i> ) <sup>3</sup>	Pres. ind.
P 1, 87	Pres. ind.
90	Imv.
2, 58	Pres. ind.
3, 80	"
85 <i>s</i> .	"
103	"
4, 145 (others <i>πᾶλη</i> )	"
8, 73 ( <i>πέπαι</i> = pres.)	"
9, 50	Fut. ind.
N 4, 79	Imv.
5, 50	"
7, 69 <i>s</i> .	Fut. or fut. w. <i>ἂν</i> .

<sup>1</sup> I have not included the corrupt *εἰ . . . κατέκειται* I 1, 41.

<sup>2</sup> Condition an afterthought, a saving clause, according to the usual interpretation.

<sup>3</sup> So with Christ for *πράσσει* (*Ἡτάρη πρᾶσση*).

<i>Protasis.</i>	<i>Apodosis.</i>
Present:	
N 7, 86	Opt. w. κε.
10, 83	Pres. ind.
85	Opt. w. κε.
I 1, 67	Pres. ind.
3 (4), 1	"
5 (6), 10	"
6 (7), 43	"
Fr. VII, 4, 9 <sup>1</sup>	"
No verb, present to be supplied:	
O 14, 7 s.	Pres. ind.
P 9, 93	Imv.
12, 28	Pres. ind.
N 9, 28	"
Future (?):	
O 7, 1	Aor. ind. (paradigmatic).
N 11, 13	Imv.
Perfect:	
N 2, 6 s.	Pres. ind.
5, 19	Opt. in an inv. sense.
I 4 (5), 22	Imv.
Imperfect:	
N 7, 74	Pres. ind.
Aorist:	
O 1, 19 s.	Imv.
55	Impf.
6, 77	Pres. ind.
8, 54	Imv.
P 11, 41	Pres. ind.
55 s.	"
N 3, 19	"
7, 75	"
11, 13	Imv.
I 5 (6), 42	Pres. ind.

Pindar like Homer has no great love for *εἰ* with the future indicative. True, there is a clear fut. ind. in Fr. VII, 4, 15 as is shown both by the combination with the present and by the minatory character, but the other examples are, to say the least, uncanny. Where *παράμευσεν* stands (Bggk. *προαμεύσεται*) we should expect the present, N 11,

<sup>1</sup> To these may be added N 4, 36 *καίπερ* (*κεῖπερ*) *ἔχεται*.



13; *παρამεύσεται* (subj.) and *ἐπιδείξῃ* might pass, or. by transposition, *ἄλλους παρამεύσατο μορφῇ*. I find no difficulty in considering *δωρήσεται* a subjunctive, and can see no valid reason for asserting, as commentators do, that Pindar does not use the so-called short form (see Stier, *Curt. Stud.* 2, 137; Gust. Meyer, *Gr. Gr.* § 528, s. 402: To me *αὐδάσομεν*, O 1, 7, which is combined with an imperative, is a subjunctive, and *βάσομεν*, O 6, 24, which is combined with a subjunctive, is a subjunctive, and *δέξεται* in a generic relative sentence, Fr. X, 4, 2, is a subjunctive.

In Pindar the Anticipatory Condition appears only in the older form *εἰ* with the subj., and only in the generic sense. In Homer *εἰ* w. subj., *εἴ κεν*, *αἶ κε*, *ἤν*, *εἰ ἄν* w. subj. all occur, the last mentioned rarely. That these forms were differentiated in pre-Homeric times is not unlikely, and there is a trace of such differentiation in Homer's preference for *εἰ* w. subj. in generic conditions and in conditions within a comparison (comp. *ὥς δ' ὅτε* w. subj.)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I have purposely expressed myself with reserve. To exclude *ἄν* (*κέν*) from all generic sentences in Homer, as has been done, seems to require too much sleight of interpretation. The questionable conditional sentences may be very few, but the temporal and relative sentences are numerous. Bäumlein, who says (s. 221): es ist doch bemerkenswerth dass Homer *αἶ κεν*, *εἰ κεν* u. *εἰ ἄν* [he means *εἰ ἄν*] nur bei der Voraussetzung der Verwirklichung einzelner Fälle, nicht aber bei allgemeinen Annahmen zu gebrauchen scheint, accepts the generic for *ὅτε κεν*, Z 225, θ 242, λ 218, ν 180, *ὅπποτε κεν* Δ 40, γ 237, *ὅτ' ἄν* B 397, I 101, λ 18, *ὥς ὅτ' ἄν* K 5, Λ 269, M 41 [?], O 80, 170, P 520, ε 394, κ 410 [? comp. M 41], χ 468, ψ 233, *ὅπποτ' ἄν* O 209, λ 17. But at this point Bäumlein gives up the analysis into particular and generic as unessential and as not always practicable. Of the other examples which he gives *εἴτ' ἄν* ρ 320, 323 would be considered by most persons generic, and so *ἐπεὶ κε* B 475, θ 554 and *ἐπὶ ἤν* θ 553, κ 411, λ 192. Under the relative he gives for *ὅς κε* A 139, 218, B 231, 346, 367, 391, Γ 354, Δ 306, Z 228, β 128, δ 29, 196, ζ 28, 159, 202 [?], θ 586, κ 22, 327, 434 [?] for *ὅστις κε* A 294, 527, Γ 279, γ 355, θ 549 [?], λ 147, ξ 445; for *ὅς ἄν* O 348, τ 332, φ 294. Some of these passages are doubtless open to objection, but the number of those in which the use would correspond exactly to the Attic use of *ἄν* and the subj. might be increased. In his Homeric Grammar, which is certain to have a marked effect on studies of this kind in England, Mr. Monro excludes *ἄν* and *κέν* from all references to frequent and indefinite occasions. It has been seen that Bäumlein was exposed to the same temptation and withstood it. Mr. Monro acknowledges the existence of exceptions, but he says they are chiefly found (1) 'in clauses which restrict or qualify a general supposition already stated, and (2) where a distinction or contrast is implied.' It is tolerably evident that this cannot be called a good working rule, and Mr. Monro's prejudice against *ἄν* in a generic sentence is strikingly shown (p. 51) where he says that the use of *ὅτ' ἄν* in a simile is not Homeric, despite the string of examples cited above and those given in Leo Meyer's AN (s. 27), which he had

Of the first class, A 80 sqq.

κρείσσων γὰρ βασιλεύς, ὅτε χάσεται ἀνδρὶ χέρι·  
εἴ περ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ  
ἀλλὰ τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον κτέ.

comp. Δ 261, K 225, α 168, μ 96, ξ 373, π 98, 116.

Of the second class, A 116:

ἦ δ' εἴ πέρ τε τύχῃσι μάλα σχεδόν, οὐ δύναται σφιν  
χραιοσμεῖν κτέ.

comp. Φ 576, X 191.

This use of εἰ with the subj. as the original and normal form for the generic conditional, accounts for the fact, otherwise unexplained, that in standard Greek ἐάν or ἤν, when transferred to the past, 'becomes,' in common parlance, εἰ with the opt., in apparent contravention of the rule that ἄν in *oratio recta* always reappears in *oratio obliqua*. So ὅταν w. subj., ἐπειδάν and the rest 'become' ὅτε, ἐπειδή and the rest with the opt., the truth being that εἰ, ὅτε, ἐπειδή and the rest with the subj. are the old forms which have naturally a corresponding εἰ, ὅτε, ἐπειδή and the rest with the opt., and this transfer to *oratio obliqua* was settled before ἐάν, ὅταν, ἐπειδάν, etc. became fixtures. The occasional emergence of ἐάν, ὅταν and the like with the optative may be due in part to a rebellion against a misunderstood tradition. Εἰ with the subj. is sometimes found in prose as a conditional form, but it is always or almost always open to suspicion. Εἰ w. subj. occurs more frequently in Attic poetry, but confusion with the opt., e. g. τύχῃ with τύχοι, often lies so near as to suggest a slip on the part of the scribe. In the few passages that are unimpeachable it would seem that a singular upturning has taken place. In Homer εἰ with the subj. is as colorless as ἐάν with the subj. in prose; whereas, as I hinted on another occasion, εἰ with the subj. in Attic approaches in tone the harshness of εἰ with the fut. ind. This is due in all likelihood to the exclusively imperative use of the pure subj. in Attic, a force which is made more sensible in this special case by the existence of the interrogative εἰ with the subj., so that we shall not go far wrong, if in the particular condition we make the significance of the Attic condi-

before him. In Pindar I would note in passing that ὥς ὅτε is commonly used without a verb, O 6, 2; P 11, 40; N 9, 16; I 5 (6), 1. When it takes a verb, it is in the indicative and not in the subj., N 8, 40.

tional *εἰ* with the subj. = *εἰ δεῖ* w. inf. However that may be, Pindar is Homeric in his use of *εἰ* w. subj.; non-Homeric in his exclusive use of it.

The examples are few :

O 6, 11: πολλοὶ δὲ μέμναι καλὸν εἴ τι ποναθῇ (generic).

P 4, 263 presents us with a specimen of *εἰ* with the subj. in comparison, if we follow the editors and not the MSS. Every one knows the allegorical subtlety of the passage, very different from the transparent disguise of the logical condition already cited. But the last word on this riddle has not been said.

P 4, 273: ἐπὶ χώρας αὐτὶς ἔσσαι δυσπαλὲς δὴ γίνεται, ἐξαπίνης | εἰ μὴ θεὸς ἀγεμόνεσσι κυβερνατὴρ γένηται (generic). The practical application follows.

N 7, 11: εἰ δὲ τύχη τις ἔρδων, μελίφρον' αἰτίαν ῥοαῖσι Μοισᾶν ἐνέβαλε. v. 14: ἔργοις δὲ καλοῖς ἔσοπτρον ἵσαμεν . . . εἰ εὖρηται ἅποινα μόχθων. The MSS have *εὖρηταί τις*, Schmid read *εὖρη τις*.

N 9, 46: εἰ γὰρ ἅμα κτείνουσι πολλοῖς ἐπίδοξον ἄρηται | κῶδος, οὐκέτ' ἔστι πρόσω θνατὸν ἔτι σκοπιᾶς ἄλλας ἐφάψασθαι ποδοῖν. Bergk's reading ἵστω λαχὼν πρὸς δαιμόνων θανμαστὸν ὄλθον, εἰ—ἄρηται does not change the character of the conditional.

I 3 (4), 58: τοῦτο γὰρ ἀθάνατον φωνᾶεν ἔρπει, | εἴ τις εὖ εἴπη τι.

I 4 (5), 12: δύο δέ τοι ζωὴς ἄωτον μούνα ποιμαίνονται τὸν ἄλπνιστον, . . . | εἴ τις εὖ πάσχωεν λόγον ἐσλὸν ἀκούῃ. As this is the only passage in which the pres. subj. occurs, a change to the aorist is suggested. It is very significant that the particular proposition follows in the opt., πάντ' ἔχεις, εἴ σε τούτων μοῖρ' ἐφίκοιτο καλῶν.

Fr. II 11, 5: εἰ δέ τις ἀνθρώποισι θεόσδοτος ἅτα | προστύχη, ταύταν σκότει κρύπτειν ἔοικεν.

In exhibiting the Ideal Condition in Pindar I shall take up first the more regular forms with *εἰ* and opt. in the protasis, followed by opt. and *κέ* in apodosis; *κέ*, for Pindar does not use *ἄν* w. opt. in a formulated conditional sentence. No poet shows better how this condition originated than Pindar, and in some passages the editors have punctuated the members so as to indicate the growth. Still we must not forget that to Pindar himself the conditional sentence was sufficiently well articulated.

O 1, 111: εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι (wish), | ἔτι γλυκύτεραν κεν ἔλπομαι . . . κλείζειν.

O 6, 4: εἰ δ' εἷη μὲν Ὀλυμπιονίκας . . . τίνα κεν φύγοι ὕμνον κείνος ἀνὴρ; | ἵστω γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ πεδίλῳ δαιμόνιον πόδ' ἔχων. A fair dream, too fair to come to pass, and yet it has come to pass. Comp. a similar

change of tone in Plat. Sympos. 175 E: *εἰ ἂν ἔχοι . . . εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ἡ σοφία* followed by *εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἡ σοφία* with a delightfully humorous change of tone, as if the fanciful supposition could be argued about.

P 3, 110: *εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἀβρὸν ὀρέξαι, | ἐλπίδ' ἔχω κλέος εὐρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω.*

A loose-jointed condition is found:

P 1, 46: *εἰ γὰρ ὁ πᾶς χρόνος . . . εὐθύνου* which wish is followed by *ῆ κεν ἀμνάσειεν*. Of such sentences there are many in Homer.

Those who recognize a kind of religious connexion between *εἰ* with the opt. in protasis and the opt. with *ἂν* (*κέν*) in the apodosis will not be pleased to see that the majority of Pindar's ideal conditions are 'irregular.' The fut. and the opt. with *ἂν* (*κέν*) are often interchangeable to our idiom. We have no pure future, and our translation of a Greek future is necessarily colored as much as our translation of a Greek opt. with *ἂν*. The large use of the opt. and *ἂν* in standard Greek is due, as I have repeatedly urged, to the greater temporal exactness and to the total negation conveyed by the aorist. So *εἰ* with opt. is followed by the future:

O 13, 105: *εἰ δὲ δαίμων γενέθλιος ἔρποι, | Δι' τοῦτ' Ἐνναλίφ τ' ἐκδώσομεν πρᾶσσειν*. A verb of hoping precedes.

With present in the apodosis:

P 1, 81: *καὶρὸν εἰ φθέγξαιο . . . μείων ἔπεται μῶμος ἀνθρώπων* (wish followed by an emphatic present 'is sure to ensue.')

P 8, 13: *κέρδος δὲ φίλτατον, ἐκόντος εἴ τις ἐκ δόμων φέροι* where *φέρη* is indeed possible. Still *εἴ τις φέροι* = *φέρειν* is an equation that solves many apparent irregularities even in Attic, and there is besides an element of wish. In like manner explain:

I 2, 33: *οὐ γὰρ πάγος οὐδὲ προσάντης ἀ κελευθος γίνεται, | εἴ τις εὐδόξων ἐς ἀνδρῶν ἄγοι τιμὰς Ἑλικωνιάδων*. The opt. of wish follows in *ἀκοντίσσαιμι*.

I 4 (5), 14: *πάντ' ἔχεις, | εἴ σε τούτων μοῖρ' ἐφίκοιτο καλῶν*. Here *ἔχεις* may be considered an equivalent to a future as above. The wish is realized, but fact seems still to be fancy.

Of the ideal conditionals there remains for discussion:

N 7, 89: *εἰ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ θεὸς ἂν ἔχοι* (so the codices; some editors give *ἀνέχοι*, Bergk *ἀλέγοι*). Pindar does not use *ἂν* in the formulated conditional sentence (if we except *ἂν ἐρεῖ* N 7, 68), and while no Greek scholar can boggle at *ἂν* and the opt. in the protasis, if it makes a fair sense, the use of it here is suspicious. And then what does *εἰ θεὸς ἂν ἔχοι* mean? Neither *ἀνέχοι* nor *ἀλέγοι* is satisfactory,

and the passage must be left for the present among the puzzles of that difficult ode.

The following are the few Unreal Conditionals in Pindar:

O 12, 16: ἢ τοι καὶ τεά κεν . . . ἀκλεῆς τιμὰ κατεφυλλορόησε ποδῶν, | εἰ μὴ στάσις ἀντιάειρα Κνωσίας σ' ἄμρσε πάτρας.

P 3, 73: εἰ κατέβαν ὑγίειαν ἄγων χρυσέαν . . . ἀστέρος οὐραίου φάμι τηλανγέστερον κείνῳ φάος ἐξικόμαν κε βαθὺν πόντον περάσαις.

N 4, 13: εἰ δ' ἔτι ζαμενεῖ Τιμόκριτος ἀελίῳ | σὸς πατὴρ ἐθάλπετο, . . . ἅμα κε τῷδε μέλει κλιθεῖς ὕμνον κελάδῃσε καλλίνικον. (If he were living, he would have sounded forth.)

N 7, 24: εἰ γὰρ ἦν (it was not and is not possible) | ἐ (sc. δμίλον ἀνδρῶν τὸν πλείστον) τὰν ἀλάθειαν ἰδέμεν, οὐ κεν ὅπλων χολωθεῖς | ὁ καρτερὸς Αἴας ἔπαξε διὰ φρενῶν | λευρὸν ξίφος.

Looser in structure with prominence of the original hopeless wish:

P 4, 43: εἰ γὰρ οἴκοι νιν βάλε (would that he had). . . . τετράτων παίδων κ' ἐπιγεγνημένων αἰμά Φοι κείναν λάβε σὺν Δαναοῖς εὐρεῖαν ἥπειρον.

P 3, 63: εἰ δὲ σῶφρων ἄντρον ἔναι' ἔτι Χείρων . . . ἱατηρὰ τοί κέν νιν πίθον . . . παρασχέιν.

In the sentence:

P 3, 1: ἦθελον Χείρωνά κε Φιλυρίδαν, | εἰ χρεῶν τοῦθ' ἀμετέρας ἀπὸ γλώσσας κοινὸν εὔξασθαι *Ἔεπος*, the apodosis of εἰ χρεῶν (sc. ἐστι) is the utterance itself, and the condition is logical = οὕτως εὔχομαι, εἰ χρή εὔξασθαι.

I have now completed the survey of the Pindaric conditional sentence. The predominance of the logical hypothesis is its most striking feature, but not the only thing worthy of note. The narrowing of epic licence is of itself a matter of importance. The Homer that Pindar knew did not sway his syntax in this great class of sentences. Pindar is simple, clear, cold. All the coloring and shading of the ever fluctuating Homeric conditional, which is all things to all circumstances, is replaced by simple formulae. There is, of course, some play of fancy in the ideal conditional; Pindar is a poet and a great poet, but he is not an eagle nor a river, and works quietly and consciously for the most part, even if he does not compose lyric sermons with seven or eight heads, more or less, according to the Terpanthian νόμος.

II.—ON *AN* AND *KEN* IN PINDAR.

As the particles *άν* and *κέν* are so largely used in certain classes of conditional sentences, I have thought it best to complete this exhibit by a conspectus of Pindar's use of them. Some scholars suppose that *άν* and *κέν* have exactly the same function and are differentiated by dialect only, *κέν* (*κά*) belonging to the Aeolic (Doric) dialect, *άν* to the Ionic, the dominant occurrence of *κέν* in Homer being explained by the adoption of a large number of Aeolic forms, or, according to a more adventurous hypothesis, by the transfusion of an older Homer from an Aeolic original.<sup>1</sup> Others have maintained that they are not only etymologically but functionally different, and many attempts have been made to formulate that difference, from Sommer down. Most of these experiments are briefly stated in Ebeling's *Lexicon Homericum* s. v. *κέ*. Sommer's essay I know only from Bäumlein's discussion of it (*Untersuchungen über die griechischen Modi*, p. 63). The samples there given show that it is an eloquent production, which sets forth the consequences of a reckless substitution of *άν* for *κέ* in appalling language. "Substitute *άν* for *κέ* in Homer," he cries, "and you produce a form of thought that is by no means in harmony with the simplicity, freedom, and liveliness of the epic language, with its vigorous sensuousness, its passion, its confident bragging, its honest good nature, and its constant quasi-gesticulation." Substitute *άν* for *κέ* and you sickly o'er the speech of Homer with the pale cast of thought, you introduce the abstract notion of conditionality, you utterly debauch the uncorrupted simplicity of the good old Epic. In fact, a history of Greek literature might be based on these momentous particles. So the Attics discarded *κέ*; they were colder, more subtle, more calculating than the Dorians. So Herodotus, renegade Dorian that he was, renounced a particle dear to the Doric dialect and set the seal to his apostasy. But while the metaphysics of fifty years ago may provoke a smile, it is not at all certain that much progress has been made in the differentiation, and many of the formulae that have been used since Sommer's time

<sup>1</sup> In the *Sitzungsberichte der K. bayer. Akademie Philol. Classe*, 1880, Heft 1, s. 73, v. Christ still follows Pott and Benfey in considering *άν* as a dialectal variety of *κέ*, an acephalous or akappous *κάν*, which he regards as proved by the Arcadian inscription cited in Cauer's *Delectus* 117. Gustav Meyer on the other hand (*Gr. Gr.* s. 26) says that, as the inscription has *άν* everywhere (so, for instance, *δ' άν*), we must read *κάν*, not *κάν*, and goes on to show, by the help of the potent *nasalis sonans*, that *κάν* and *κέ* (*κέν*) must have been different originally.

are no better, even if they are more intelligible than his. The comparative grammarians, to whom we ethnic grammarians look for light, give us very little help and leave us to our own devices. Delbrück<sup>1</sup> maintains that *ἄν* and *κέν* are etymologically absolutely

<sup>1</sup> Delbrück first enunciates his view thus (Conj. u. Opt. p. 23): *κέν* und *ἄν* haben nicht die Macht, den Gebrauch des Modus zu modificiren, sondern sind sprachliche Zeichen des modificirten Gebrauches; and again where he treats the matter at greater length he says (p. 90): sie begleiten den Conjunctiv u. Opt. durch alle inneren Wandlungen, aber sie erzeugen dieselben nicht. In other words, subjunctive and opt. may have the same signification with *ἄν* and *κέν* as without *ἄν* and *κέν*. Only in the course of time, by some mysterious process, the subj. attended by *ἄν* differentiates itself from the pure subj., opt. and *ἄν* from pure opt. '*Ἀν* and *κέν* of themselves point only to the 'ingress of the action.' But this does not explain how wish was turned into potentiality, demand into prediction; and indeed the abstention from explanation may be the wisest possible course. Only it has always seemed to me that Hermann himself did not draw the legitimate consequences from his own theory, neither have those who consider *ἄν* and *κέν* to be particular demonstratives—a view which brings them dangerously near to *γέ*—stretched that theory to its utmost. Hermann makes *ἄν* with the opt. further from reality than the pure opt. This is contradicted by the whole tenor of the language and is in contravention of his own principle of conditionality. Condition a wish at any point and you remove it from the realm of wish to the realm of thought. It becomes something calculable, something that can be asserted. It moves into the sphere of the indicative. Narrow the subj., the opt., to a case or class of cases, and the subjunctive, the opt., cease to be absolute. If this view is true, we shall have to consider *ἄν* and *κέν* as something more than mere attendants on subj. and opt. Nor will the theory of attendance satisfy the conditions in the case of *ἄν* with the indicative. '*Ἀν* (*κέν*) is necessary for the unreal, for the ideal, indicative aor. That it is not necessary for the unreal imperfect lies in the durative character of the tense. Those who maintain that *ἄν* when combined with the subj. 'belongs to' the leading particle or the relative, are really maintaining that the *ἄν* of the subjunctive belongs to the apodosis, a position which is utterly untenable. That it ceased to be felt, that it became a mere formula is clear enough; but Pindar's usage, arbitrary as it may seem, is at least suggestive. The large use of subj. with *ἄν* in the temporal sentence, from which the future indicative is practically excluded in prose except in a narrow class, is to my mind due to the necessity felt for a sharper future, for a future which should show the relativity of the clauses more distinctly than the future indicative could do. Whatever difference there may have been between the subj. and the subj. with *ἄν* was effaced in the interest of exact temporal relation. The relative followed, then the conditional, with traces enough in poetry of the old pure subjunctive usage. In the same way the optative with *ἄν* gave the color to the future relation, which was denied to the future tense by its subjunctive affinities; it gave the exactness of duration, attainment, ingress which could only be found in the modal spheres of present, second aorist and first aorist. English has gone a similar way but has gone further. 'Will' and 'shall' have virtually crowded out the future from the principal sentence except where the will is the deed.

different, *κέν* being the Sanskrit *kam* (so that this 'familiar beast' of a particle ultimately 'signifies *love*'), while *ἄν* has no foreign parallel; but he comes to the conclusion that neither the parallel with *kam* nor the etymology is of any avail. Leo Meyer—to cite authorities not mentioned in the *Lexicon Homericum*—has convinced himself that *ἄν*, so far from having no foreign parallel, is identical with Latin *an* and Gothic *an*. In other words, he has gone back to Bopp's view, and a simple demonstrative is wrested into an alternative. It would have been safer to have kept *ἄν* back on remoter ground, for the Latin *an* itself is often a simple 'then.' In a recent treatise Dr. Thiemann (*Grundzüge der homerischen Modussyntax*, p. 56) sums up his investigation thus: "By the particle *κε* the speaker points to himself so far as there is a reference of his own will or his own representation (*Vorstellung*) to the action; by the particle *ἄν* the speaker points to special circumstances which may lie beyond his calculation, but which are intended to serve as a ground or modification of the thought." That is to me nothing but the old tune of *ἄν* objective, *κέν* subjective; nothing but Casseilmann's *κέν* ad cogitationem eius qui loquatur, *ἄν* ad rem ipsam referri, nothing but Sommer's bragging *κέν* and his calculating *ἄν*. We do not advance an inch.

Mr. Monro in his recently published *Homeric Grammar*, which is doubtless more accessible to my readers than the various monographs cited in the *Lexicon Homericum*, after committing himself to the view that the primary use of *ἄν* and *κέν* is to show that the speaker is thinking of particular instances or occasions, devotes a section to 'the difference of *ἄν* and *κέν*,' and notices the greater frequency of *κέν*, the preference for *ἄν* in negative clauses, the rare use of *ἄν* with the relative, the employment of *κέν* both in protasis and apodosis, whereas *ἄν* is especially used in the second of two parallel or connected clauses, and the indications of the use of *ἄν* as a more emphatic particle than *κέν*, and sums up thus: "The general effect of these differences of usage between the two particles seems to be that *ἄν* is used either in an *adversative* sense—with a second or opposed alternative—or when greater *emphasis* has to be expressed." *Κέν* is approximately 'then,' 'in that case,' *κέν*—*κέν* 'in one case,' 'in another case,' *ἄν* 'then indeed,' 'then rather,' 'even in that case.' Mr. Monro also calls attention to the difference of the accent, a point which Lange had emphasized before him. The enclisis of *κέν* seems to me to indicate that *κέν* had passed through the stages which *ἄν* had not yet wholly completed, when we first become



acquainted with Greek. Lange's parallel of *ἄν* with *εἷς* and *κέ* with *τις* is peculiarly suggestive in view of the Germanic treatment of 'einer' and 'one.'

The degradation of *ἄν* from an original demonstrative 'that,' 'other,' or what not, may be fairly paralleled by the fortunes of the demonstrative *τέως*. *Τέως*, 'so long,' originally a strong demonstrative correlative of *έως* is used comparatively seldom with an expressed term. The limit is often brought in as an afterthought, suggested, implied, left vague. *Τέως* is often practically 'for a while,' 'for the time being.' This is just the way that *ἄν* behaves. Now it has a definite reference, now it is indefinite. Sometimes the reference is supplied by the context, sometimes by the opposite. But we can still divine its history. Not so with *κέν*. *Κέν* has passed through all the stages that *ἄν* was to traverse.

But whatever difference of etymology or function there may have been, in Pindar's use there is little vestige of the original diversity. What little trace there is, however, will best appear upon exhibition of the use.

The occurrences of *κέν* that I find recorded are thirty-three:

1. O 1, 84: *τά κέ τις ἀνώνυμον γῆρας . . . ἔψοι μάταν.* 2. O 1, 111: *εἰ δέ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι, ἔτι γλυκυτέραν κεν ἔλπομαι . . . κλείξιν.* 3. O 6, 4: *εἰ δ' εἷη μὲν Ὀλυμπιονίκας . . . τίνα κεν φύγοι ὕμνον.* 4. O 8, 82: *ἐνέποι κεν Καλλιμάχῳ.* 5. O 10 (11), 20: *θίξαις δέ κε φύιτ' ἀρετᾶ ποτὶ | πελώριον ὀρμάσαι κλέος.* 6. O 12, 13: *ἦτοι καὶ τεά κεν . . . ἀκλεῆς τιμὰ κατεφυλλορόησε ποδῶν, | εἰ μὴ στάσις . . . σ' ἄμερσε πάτρας.* 7. P 1, 45: *εἰ γὰρ ὁ πᾶς χρόνος ἄλβον . . . εὐθύνοι . . . ἦ κεν ἀμνάσειεν.* 8. P 1, 69: *σύν τοι τίν κεν ἀγῆτηρ ἀνὴρ . . . δᾶμον . . . τράποι . . . ἐς ἡσυχίαν.* 9. P 3, 1: *ἦθελον Χείρωνά κε Φιλυρίδαν.* 10, 11. P 3, 63: *εἰ δὲ σάφρων αἰτρον ἔναι' ἔτι Χείρων . . . λατῆρά τοι κέν νιν πίθον καὶ νῦν . . . παρασχέιν καὶ κεν ἐν νανυσὶν μόλον.* 12. P 3, 73: *εἰ κατέβαν ὑγίειαν ἄγων . . . ἀστέρος . . . τηλαυγέστερον κένω φάος ἐξικόμαν κε.* 13. P 3, 110: *εἰ δέ μοι πλοῖτον θεὸς ἄβρὸν ὀρέξαι, ἔλπιδ' ἔχω κλέος εὐρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρῶσω.* 14. P 4, 43: *εἰ γὰρ οἴκοι νιν βάλε παρ χθόνιον | Ἄϊδα στόμα . . . τετράτων παίδων κ' ἐπιγενομένων αἶμα . . . κείναν λάβει σὺν Δαναοῖς εὐρείαν ἄπειρον.* 15. P 4, 50: *νῦν . . . εὐρήσει . . . γένος, οἳ κεν . . . τέκωνται . . . δεσπύταν.* 16. P 4, 293: *εὐχεται . . . οἶκον ἰδεῖν . . . καὶ κε μυθίσαιθ' ὅποιαν Ἀρκεσίλῃ | εὖρε παγὰν ἀμβροσίῳ ἐπέων.* 17. P 7, 20: *φαντί γε μὰν οὕτω κεν ἀνδρὶ παρμονίμαν | θάλλοισαν εὐδαιμονίαν | τὰ καὶ τὰ φέρεσθαι.* 18. P 10, 61: *τῶν δ' ἕκαστος ὀρούει, τυχῶν κεν ἀρπαλέαν σχέθοι φροντίδα.* 19. N 4, 7: *ῥῆμα δ' ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει, ὃ τι κε . . . γλῶσσα φρενὸς ἐξέλτοι (ἐξέλη) βαθείας.* 20. N 4, 13: *εἰ δ' ἔτι ζαμενεῖ Τιμόκριτος ἀελίῳ | σὸς πατὴρ ἐθάλπτο . . . θάμα κε τῷδε μελεῖ κλιθεῖς*

ὕμνον κελάδῃσε καλλίνικον. 21. N 4, 30: ἀπειρομάχας ἑὼν κε φανείῃ λόγον  
 ὁ μὴ συνείης. 22. N 4, 93: οἶον αἰνέων κε Μελησίαν ἔριδα στρέφοι. 23. N  
 6, 72: δελφῖνι κεν τάχος εἰκάσοιμι Μελησίαν. 24. N 7, 25: εἰ γὰρ ἦν |  
 τὰν ἀλάθειαν ιδέμεν, οὐ κεν ὅπλων χολωθείς | ὁ καρτερός Δῖας ἔπαξε διὰ φρενῶν  
 λευρὸν ξίφος. 25. N 7, 86: εἰ δὲ δεύεται | ἀνδρὸς ἀνὴρ τι, φαῖμέν κε γείτον'  
 ἔμμεναι . . . χάρμα πάντων ἐπάξιον. 26. N 7, 89: εἰ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ θεὸς ἀνέχοι, |  
 ἐν τίν κ' ἐθέλοι . . . εὐτυχῶς ναίειν. 27. N 9, 34: Χρομίῳ κεν ὑπασπίζων  
 . . . ἔκρινας ἂν κίνδυνον. 28. N 10, 39: ἀξιοθείην κεν, ἑὼν Θρασύκλον . . .  
 ξύγγονος, Ἄργεϊ μὴ κρύπτειν ὀμμάτων. 29. N 10, 87: εἰ δὲ κασιγνήτον  
 πέρι | μάρτυσαι . . . ἤμισυ μὲν κε πνέοις. 30. I 4 (5), 48: καὶ νῦν . . .  
 μαρτυρήσαι κεν πόλις. 31. I 5 (6), 72: φαίης κέ νιν . . . ἔμμεν Ναξίαν . . .  
 ἀκόναν. 32. I 7 (8), 45: ἐρατὸν λύοι κεν χαλινὸν ὑφ' ἥρωι παρθενίας. 33.  
 Fr. IX, 3, 2: ἐν ξυνῶ κεν εἴη . . . γλυκερὸν κέντρον.

As to Mood and Tense:

Indic. Imperf. 9	I
Aor. 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20, 24, 27	8
Opt. Pres. 1, 4, 22, 23, 26, 29, 32, 33	8
Aor. <sup>1</sup> 3, 5, 7, 8, 16, 18, 21, 25, 28, 30, 31	11
Subj. Aor. 15, 19 (schol.)	2
Inf. Pres. 17	I
Aor. 13	I
Fut. 2	I

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As to Character:

The classification of these examples is not easy. Most of them occur in conditional complexes. So 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29. Few of them are regularly formulated; for though Pindar is familiar with the formula, he still retains the sense of the origin. Clearly formulated are 2, 3, 6, 13, 24, 25, 26, 29, but some are loose-jointed—a wish followed at a distance by a thought, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20—one, 16, involves a wish, the rest have the protasis involved in a participle, 5, 18, 21, 22, 27, 28, or a demonstrative 17, or a modifier as *σὺν τίν* 8. There is one Homeric *οἷ* κεν with the subj. as an exact future 15, one generic relative if we trust the scholia 19. The rest of the thirty-three are potentials and there is nothing gained by forcing them into the conditional formula. So 1, 4, 9, 23, 30, 31, 32, 33. It may be worth

<sup>1</sup> It may be well to add that *φαῖμεν* (N 7, 87), *φαίης* (I 5 (6), 72), and *σχέθου* (P 10, 61, comp. I 4, 72), are counted as aorists.

noticing that there is no negative expressed except 25 (N 7, 25), but a negative is implied 1 (O 1, 84), 3 (O 6, 6).

Formulated conditionals	8
Half formulated	6
Involved	9
Relative conditional (generic)	1
With subj. as exact future	1
Potential	8

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33

\**ἂν* occurs :

1. O 2, 18: ἀποίητον οὐδ' ἂν χρόνος . . . δύναιτο θέμεν . . . τέλος. 2. O 2, 20: λάβα δὲ πότμῳ σὺν εὐδαίμονι γένοιτ' ἂν. 3. O 2, 110: τίς ἂν φράσαι δύναιτο. 4. O 6, 67: εὐτ' ἂν . . . Ἡρακλῆς . . . κτίσῃ. 5. O 7, 42: ὥς ἂν θεῶ κτίσαιεν. 6. O 8, 62: κείνα δὲ κείνος ἂν εἴποι | ἔργα περαιτέρων ἄλλων. 7. O 9, 30: πῶς ἂν . . . Ἡρακλῆς σκύταλον τίναξε. 8. O 13, 46: οὐκ ἂν εἰδείην λέγειν. 9. O 13, 103: τότ' ἂν φαίην σαφές. 10. P 1, 100: ὅς ἂν ἐγκύρσῃ καὶ ἔλῃ . . . στέφανον δέδεκται. 11. P 3, 106: εὐτ' ἂν . . . ἐπιβρίσῃ (Mommsen after the schol.), ἐπιβρίσαις ἔπηται (Bergk). 12. P 4, 76: εὐτ' ἂν . . . μολῇ. 13. P 5, 65: διδωσί τε Μοῖσαν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ. 14. P 9, 119: εἶπε δ' ἐν μέσσοις ἀπάγεσθαι, ὅς ἂν πρῶτος θορῶν | ἀμφὶ Φοι ψαύσειε πέπλοις. 15. P 10, 23: ὕμνητὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ γίνεται σοφοῖς, ὅς ἂν . . . τὰ μέγιστ' ἀέθλων ἔλῃ. 16. P 10, 29: οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν ἂν εὖροις (the old codices have no ἂν). 17. N 4, 91: τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ἂν τις ἴδῃ, ἔλπεται τις ἕκαστος ἐξοχώτατα φάσθαι. 18. N 7, 68: μαθὼν δέ τις ἂν ἐρεῖ. 19. N 7, 89: εἰ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ θεὸς ἂν ἔχοι (so the best MSS), ἀνέχοι Thiersch, Boeckh, Mommsen, ἀλέγοι Bergk. 20. N 9, 35: ἔκρινας ἂν κίνδυνον, according to some, resumption of preceding κέν, really preposition. 21. N 11, 26: ναὶ μὰ γὰρ ὄρκον, ἐμὰν δόξαν . . . κάλλιον ἂν δριμύνων ἐνόστησ' ἀντιπάλων. 22. Fr. IX 2, 10: τάκομαι εὐτ' ἂν ἴδω.

Add to these the passages which have coalesced with *ὅτε* as *ὅταν* : 23. O 2, 23: πῆμα θνάσκει . . . ὅταν θεοῦ Μοῖρα πέμπε (v.l. πέμψῃ)<sup>1</sup> κτέ. 24. O 10 (11), 91: ὅταν . . . εἰς Ἀῖδα σταθμὸν ἀνὴρ ἵκηται . . . ἔπορε . . . βραχύ τι τερπνόν. 25. O 13, 80: κελήσατό νιν ὅταν . . . καρταίποδ' ἀναρύη . . . θέμεν βωμόν. 26. P 2, 11: ἐπὶ γὰρ . . . Ἑρμᾶς τίθησι κόσμον, ξεστὸν ὅταν δίφρον καταξυγνή. 27. P 5, 2: ὁ πλοῦτος εὐρυσθενής, ὅταν τις . . . αὐτὸν ἀνάγῃ πολυ-

<sup>1</sup> The durative tenses of *πέμπειν* are often found where novices would expect the aorist. *Πέμπειν* does not convey the idea of detachment as 'send' does. Still *πέμψῃ* here has good warrant.

φιλον ἐπέταν. 28. P 8, 96: ὅταν αἴγλα διόσδοτος ἔλθῃ, λαμπρὸν φέγγος  
ἔπεισιν ἀνδρῶν. 29. N 1, 67: ὅταν θεοὶ . . . ἀντιρίζωσιν . . . πεφύρσεσθαι  
κόμαν ἔνεπεν. 30. I 2, 47: ταῦτα . . . ἀπόνειμον, ὅταν ξείνων ἐμὸν . . . ἔλθῃς.  
"An has coalesced with ὅποτε: 31. P 1, 4: πείθονται δ' αἰοῖδοι σάμασιν,  
. . . ὅπότεν . . . ἀμβολὰς τεύχῃς. 32. P 8, 8: τὸ δ', ὅπότεν τις . . . κότον  
ἐνελάσῃ . . . τιθεῖς ὕβριν ἐν ἄντλῳ.<sup>1</sup>

But this number is to be reduced to 30 by excluding 19 and 20. Nor is 18 thoroughly satisfactory, for while the future with *ἄν* is not to be scouted so furiously as has been done of late, *ἀνερῆ* lies near. 'Any one is welcome to trumpet it.' In 14 *ἄν* may be *ἀνά* and *ἀναθρώων* would give color to the picture. Imagine part at least of the unexpectant youths seated. Still the opt. and *ἄν* can be used in the protasis, and is more frequently used in the protasis of generic relative sentences than might be supposed. In Pindar it is not likely that the construction has shifted from *ὅς ἄν*—*ψαύσῃ* to *ὅς ἄν*—*ψαύσει*, which would be a convenient explanation for prose.

As to Mood and Tense:

Ind. Aor. 7, 20 (?), 21	3 (2)
Fut. 18	1
Opt. Pres. 1, 3, 8 (Perf. = Pres.), 19 (?)	4 (3)
Aor. 2, 5, 6, 9 ( <i>φαίην</i> = aor.), 14 (?), 16	6
Subj. Pres. 13, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31	6
Aor. 4, 10, 12, 15, 17, 22, 24, 28, 30, 32	10
Pres. or Aor. according to reading 11, 23	2
	<hr/>
	32 (30)

As to Character:

Formulated Conditional 19 (?)	1 (0)
Virtual Condition 16, 18, 20 (?), 21	4 (3)
Potential (positive) 2, 5 (= imper.), 6, 9	4
(negative) 1, 3 (equiv.), 7 (equiv.), 8	4
Relative (generic) 10, 13, 14, 15, 17 <sup>2</sup>	5

<sup>1</sup> *ἄν τεκεῖν* I 7 (8), 33 has no MS warrant, and is unlikely after *πεπρωμένον ἦν*.

<sup>2</sup> Generic relatives without *ἄν* occur O 3, 11 (*ῥῥτινι . . . βάλλῃ*); O 6, 75 (*οἷς . . . ποτιστάξῃ*); O 8, 10 (*ῥῥτινι . . . ἔσπῃται γέρας*); O 8, 23 (*ὃ τι ῥέπη* Bergk); N 3, 71 (*ὡν τις . . . γέννηται*); N 9, 44 (*οἷ . . . γένωνται*); I 1 50 (*ὅς . . . ἄρηται*); I 6 (7), 19 (*ὃ τι μὴ σοφίας ἄωτον ἄκρον ἰκηται*); to which I would add Fr. X 4, 2 (*οἷσι . . . δέξεται* = *δέξεται*). Nearly all aorists.

## Temporal (whenever)

Pres. of a single time, definite person 25, 29, 30	3
general of a definite person 23, 31	2
person and time general 27, 28	2
Aor. of a single time, definite person 4, 12	2
general of a definite person 22, 26	2
person and time general 24, 32	2
Doubtful 11 (general)	1

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 32 (30)

A comparison of these tables shows that *ἄν* has gained on *κέν*, if we take Homer as a standard. In the Iliad according to Hinrichs' count (see Monro's Homeric Grammar, p. 265), *κέν* stands to *ἄν* as 4 : 1. In Pindar they nearly balance. In the formulated condition (with *εἰ*) *ἄν* is not used at all by Pindar either in protasis or in apodosis, although from its supposed demonstrative nature we should expect it at a time when the conditional must have assumed sharper formulae. Yet at this point Pindar parts company with Homer, or rather, as we have seen, he makes an exclusive rule where Homer only shows preference. There is no *ἄν* in either protasis or apodosis, there is no *κέν* in protasis. So we have a decided narrowing. Even in so-called virtual conditions, *ἄν* is little used by Pindar. So where the participle readily suggests the protasis as in 16 (P 10, 29), *ἰὼν ἄν εὖροις*, Bergk writes *τάχ' εὖροις*, the old MSS having no *ἄν*. 18 (N 7, 68) and 20 (N 9, 32) have been discussed already. This leaves 21 (N 11, 24) where *ἐμὴν δόξαν* prepares us for a potential. Of course it may be maintained that even in Pindar *ἄν* is only a sign and not a cause of the altered use of the mood, as we find the potential opt. without *ἄν*, O 11 (10), 21, where Hartung dares to write *διαλλάξαιντ' ἄν ἦθος* despite digamma. P 4, 110: *ἰκοίμαν* rests on conjecture, though the conjecture seems inevitable. Still I think it will appear that *ἄν* following *-αν* has often been omitted, not only by accident but on purpose, the delicate ears of poet and rhetorician hating the cacophony. N 5, 20 and P 11, 50 are not stringent, and the famous O 3, 45: *οὗ νιν διώξω· κεινὸς εἶην* is to be explained by the imperative optative. 'Set me down an empty fool!' (if I do).

The preference of *ἄν* for the negative as compared with *κέν* comes out, but not startlingly. Mr. Monro accounts for this preference thus: 'When we speak of an event as not happening in certain circumstances we almost necessarily think of the *opposite* circumstances,

those in which it will happen; as οὐκ ἂν τοι χραίσμη κιθάρις, the lyre will not avail (viz. in *battle, whatever it may do elsewhere*). This is essentially Leo Meyer's view. According to this doctrine ἂν would produce the effect of a reserve as γέ does. But surely this is not the effect of the negative opt. with ἂν, which is often made to sweep away every trace of reserve. At least this is what it comes to in Attic. The opt. with ἂν gives the warmth of personal conviction and the potential subjunctive has the like force in Latin, as is shown by the striking passage in Livy where *possit* is combined with *potest* (29, 18): nostras iniurias nec potest nec possit alius ulcisci quam vos, in which on any theory *nec possit* intensifies *nec potest*. The metaphysics of a suggested opposite will not help us to the conception. See the numerous passages in Greek where the negated aor. opt. and ἂν is coupled with the future positive. Andok. 1, 4: οὔτ' ἂν ὑπομείναιμι οἰχίσσομαι τε φεύγων—Ar. Ach. 404: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέλθοιμ' ἀλλὰ κόψω τὴν θύραν—Isokr. 15, 260: ἐγὼ δ' οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποιμι τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις χρήσομαι περὶ αὐτοῦ—Isai. 6, 23: οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γένοιτο—φανήσονται δὲ—καὶ ἔσονται. So with neg. fut. (the difference being one of total negation and persistent negation), Eur. I. A. 310: οὐκ ἂν μεθείμην—οὐδ' ἔγωγ' ἀφίσσομαι—Hdt. 9, 111: οὔτε ἂν τοι δοίην θυγατέρα τὴν ἐμὴν γῆμαι οὔτε ἐκείνη πλεῖνα χρόνον συνοικήσεις. But it is needless to multiply Attic examples, as the usage is doubtless more or less familiar, and it may be considered historically unjustifiable to cite Attic usage on such a matter. And yet it seems to me that in so common a combination as οὐκ ἂν with the opt. there can be no break in the tradition. It meant the same thing in the Homeric period, whenever that period was, that it meant in Attic. I have gone through the passages cited in the Lexicon Homericum, s. v. οὐ (an imperfect list, to be sure), and have examined them. Pres. opt. w. ἂν, A 271, 301, B 250, Z 129, [141 om.], Θ 210, 444, 517, Ξ 335, Υ 134, [Φ 358 omitted], Ω 297, δ 78, η 293, θ 239, λ 380, π 85, 318, 400, ρ 387, σ 414, τ 107, 348 (falsely recorded 342), υ 135, 322. Aor. opt. with ἂν, Γ 66, 223, Δ 223 (falsely recorded 283), Ε 32, 85, Ζ 522, Θ 21, 451, Κ 204, Ν 289, Ξ 126, 247, Ο 40, Ρ 489, Φ 462, Ω 565, γ 227, δ 347, ι 241, ο 321, ρ 138, 268, 497, υ 392, χ 325, ω 435. The effect of warm, personal negation, so to speak, is the same as in Attic. Whatever restrictive idea is noticeable comes not from ἂν but from γέ (*e. g.* Z 129, Φ 358), or from the position of the word to which the restriction applies (*e. g.* A 271, Ν 289). The aorist preponderates apparently not so much as in Attic, owing to the recurrence of the same verbs, so especially ἐθέλομαι (Z 141, Θ 210, Γ 444, Υ 134,

II 318, 400), but still it preponderates, and it is safe to say, as Leo Meyer acknowledges, that the Homeric  $\alpha\upsilon\kappa$   $\alpha\upsilon$  with the opt. has to all intents and purposes reached the ordinary prose usage. However we get at it, through demonstrative, through alternative, if  $\alpha\upsilon$  with the negatived opt. is equivalent to 'in any case,' we get what must have been essentially the effect. That  $\alpha\upsilon$  is preferred to  $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  with the negative is clear; but if we exclude metrical considerations we must rest content with the tendency of the negative to the stronger of two forms. The negative prefers  $\alpha\upsilon$  to  $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ , as it prefers the total negation of the aorist to the persistent opposition of the present optative. Nor is it unworthy of note that where  $\alpha\upsilon$  is repeated in the standard language, it is repeated largely with negatives or equivalents.

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